The essays in this collection have been written for Gerd Buchdahl, by colleagues, students and friends, and are self-standing pieces of original research which have as their main concern the metaphysics and philosophy of science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They focus on issues about the development of philosophical and scientific thought which are raised by or in the work of such as Bernoulli, Descartes, Galileo, Kant, Leibniz, Maclaurin, Priestly, Schelling, Vico. Apart from the initial bio-bibliographical piece and (...) those by Robert Butts and Michael Power, they do not discuss Buchdahl or his ideas in any systematic, lengthy, or detailed way. But they are collected under a title which alludes to the book, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins, Descartes to Kant (1969), which is central in the corpus of his work, and deal with the period and some of the topics with which that book deals. (shrink)

Together, these collected papers develop the idea that human thinking - from scientific creativity to simply understanding what a positive HIV test means - "happens" partly outside the mind.".

The Empire of Chance tells how quantitative ideas of chance transformed the natural and social sciences, as well as daily life over the last three centuries. A continuous narrative connects the earliest application of probability and statistics in gambling and insurance to the most recent forays into law, medicine, polling and baseball. Separate chapters explore the theoretical and methodological impact in biology, physics and psychology. Themes recur - determinism, inference, causality, free will, evidence, the shifting meaning of probability - but (...) in dramatically different disciplinary and historical contexts. In contrast to the literature on the mathematical development of probability and statistics, this book centres on how these technical innovations remade our conceptions of nature, mind and society. Written by an interdisciplinary team of historians and philosophers, this readable, lucid account keeps technical material to an absolute minimum. It is aimed not only at specialists in the history and philosophy of science, but also at the general reader and scholars in other disciplines. (shrink)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore artificial moral agency by reflecting upon the possibility of a Moral Turing Test and whether its lack of focus on interiority, i.e. its behaviouristic foundation, counts as an obstacle to establishing such a test to judge the performance of an Artificial Moral Agent. Subsequently, to investigate whether an MTT could serve as a useful framework for the understanding, designing and engineering of AMAs, we set out to address fundamental challenges within (...) the field of robot ethics regarding the formal representation of moral theories and standards. Here, typically three design approaches to AMAs are available: top-down theory-driven models and bottom-up approaches which set out to model moral behaviour by means of models for adaptive learning, such as neural networks, and finally, hybrid models, which involve components from both top-down and bottom-up approaches to the modelling of moral agency. With inspiration from Allen and Wallace as well as Prior, we elaborate on theoretically driven approaches to machine ethics by introducing deontic tense logic. Finally, within this framework, we explore the character of human interaction with a robot which has successfully passed an MTT. Design/methodology/approach – The ideas in this paper reflect preliminary theoretical considerations regarding the possibility of establishing a MTT based on the evaluation of moral behaviour, which focusses on moral reasoning regarding possible actions. The thoughts reflected fall within the field of normative ethics and apply deontic tense logic to discuss the possibilities and limitations of artificial moral agency. Findings – The authors stipulate a formalisation of logic of obligation, time and modality, which may serve as a candidate for implementing a system corresponding to an MTT in a restricted sense. Hence, the authors argue that to establish a present moral obligation, we need to be able to make a description of the actual situation and the relevant general moral rules. Such a description can never be complete, as the combination of exhaustive knowledge about both situations and rules would involve a God eye’s view, enabling one to know all there is to know and take everything relevant into consideration before making a perfect moral decision to act upon. Consequently, due to this frame problem, from an engineering point of view, we can only strive for designing a robot supposed to operate within a restricted domain and within a limited space-time region. Given such a setup, the robot has to be able to perform moral reasoning based on a formal description of the situation and any possible future developments. Although a system of this kind may be useful, it is clearly also limited to a particular context. It seems that it will always be possible to find special cases in which a given system does not pass the MTT. This calls for a new design of moral systems with trust-related components which will make it possible for the system to learn from experience. Originality/value – It is without doubt that in the near future we are going to be faced with advanced social robots with increasing autonomy, and our growing engagement with these robots calls for the exploration of ethical issues and stresses the importance of informing the process of engineering ethical robots. Our contribution can be seen as an early step in this direction. (shrink)

Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart invites readers to embark on a new journey into a land of rationality that differs from the familiar territory of cognitive science and economics. Traditional views of rationality tend to see decision makers as possessing superhuman powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and all of eternity in which to ponder choices. To understand decisions in the real world, we need a different, more psychologically plausible notion of rationality, and this book provides it. It is about (...) fast and frugal heuristics--simple rules for making decisions when time is pressing and deep thought an unaffordable luxury. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, classifications, and predictions by employing bounded rationality. But when and how can such fast and frugal heuristics work? Can judgments based simply on one good reason be as accurate as those based on many reasons? Could less knowledge even lead to systematically better predictions than more knowledge? Simple Heuristics explores these questions, developing computational models of heuristics and testing them through experiments and analyses. It shows how fast and frugal heuristics can produce adaptive decisions in situations as varied as choosing a mate, dividing resources among offspring, predicting high school drop out rates, and playing the stock market. As an interdisciplinary work that is both useful and engaging, this book will appeal to a wide audience. It is ideal for researchers in cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science, as well as in economics and artificial intelligence. It will also inspire anyone interested in simply making good decisions. (shrink)

Axiomatic rationality is defined in terms of conformity to abstract axioms. Savage limited axiomatic rationality to small worlds, that is, situations in which the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of future states S and their consequences C are known. Others have interpreted axiomatic rationality as a categorical norm for how human beings should reason, arguing in addition that violations would lead to real costs such as money pumps. Yet a review of the literature shows little evidence that violations are actually (...) associated with any measurable costs. Limiting axiomatic rationality to small worlds, I propose a naturalized version of rationality for situations of intractability and uncertainty, all of which are not in. In these situations, humans can achieve their goals by relying on heuristics that may violate axiomatic rationality. The study of ecological rationality requires formal models of heuristics and an analysis of the structures of environments these can exploit. It lays the foundation of a moderate naturalism in epistemology, providing statements about heuristics we should use in a given situation. Unlike axiomatic rationality, ecological rationality can explain less-is-more effects, formalize when one should move from ‘is’ to ‘ought,’ and be evaluated by goals beyond coherence, such as predictive accuracy, frugality, and efficiency. Ecological rationality can be seen as a formalization of means–end instrumentalist rationality, based on Herbert Simon’s insight that rational behavior is a function of the mind and its environment. (shrink)

Background: Many nursing homes appear as multicultural workplaces where the majority of healthcare providers have an ethnic minority background. This environment creates challenges linked to communication, interaction and cultural differences. Furthermore, the healthcare providers have varied experiences and understanding of what quality care of patients with dementia involves. Purpose: The aim of this study is to illuminate multi-ethnic healthcare providers’ lived experiences of their own working relationship, and its importance to quality care for people with dementia. Research design: The study (...) is part of a greater participatory action research project: ‘Hospice values in the care for persons with dementia’. The data material consists of extensive notes from seminars, project meetings and dialogue-based teaching. The text material was subjected to phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretation. Participants and research context: Participants in the project were healthcare providers working in a nursing home unit. The participants came from 15 different countries, had different formal qualifications, varied backgrounds and ethnic origins. Ethical considerations: The study is approved by the Norwegian Regional Ethics Committee and the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. Findings: The results show that good working relationships, characterized by understanding each other’s vulnerability and willingness to learn from each other through shared experiences, are prerequisites for quality care. The healthcare providers further described ethical challenges as uncertainty and different understandings. Discussion: The results are discussed in the light of Lögstrup’s relational philosophy of ethics and the concepts of vulnerability, ethic responsibility, trust and openness of speech. Conclusion: The prerequisite for quality care for persons with dementia in a multicultural working environment is to create arenas for open discussions between the healthcare providers. Leadership is of great importance. (shrink)

Gerd Buchdahl; XIV—The Relation Between ‘Understanding’ and ‘Reason’ in the Architectonic of Kant's Philosophy1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume.

This volume collects Gigerenzer's recent articles on the psychology of rationality. This volume should appeal, like the earlier volumes, to a broad mixture of cognitive psychologists, philosophers, economists, and others who study decision making.

This commentary argues that, in discussing the racial and cultural identities of cinematic representations of humanoid AI robots, nuances and differentiations are beneficial. It suggests that the essay on which the present text comments does not sufficiently acknowledge the range of identities found in AI films, in particular in Alex Garland's Ex Machina.

Can the general public learn to deal with risk and uncertainty, or do authorities need to steer people’s choices in the right direction? Libertarian paternalists argue that results from psychological research show that our reasoning is systematically flawed and that we are hardly educable because our cognitive biases resemble stable visual illusions. For that reason, they maintain, authorities who know what is best for us need to step in and steer our behavior with the help of “nudges.” Nudges are nothing (...) new, but justifying them on the basis of a latent irrationality is. In this article, I analyze the scientific evidence presented for such a justification. It suffers from narrow logical norms, that is, a misunderstanding of the nature of rational thinking, and from a confirmation bias, that is, selective reporting of research. These two flaws focus the blame on individuals’ minds rather than on external causes, such as industries that spend billions to nudge people into unhealthy behavior. I conclude that the claim that we are hardly educable lacks evidence and forecloses the true alternative to nudging: teaching people to become risk savvy. (shrink)

Rhetoric as a persuasive technique, school subject and social practice has determined our literary and social linguistic life since the 5th century BC. Its history is the history of the production of speech under changing social conditions. Rhetoric has managed to re-establish itself as an academic subject at German universities since the 1960s, and today, in our advanced media society, it plays an outstanding role in advertising, sales and the social technology of management. - The Rhetoric Yearbook summarises rhetoric research (...) in Germany and presents new publications in an extended review section. A current bibliography provides information on all German-language publications related to rhetoric.Contributions are published in English, French and German. (shrink)

Under the influence of a reading style that Avital Ronell has called “narcoanalysis,” this article performs a reading of addiction and humility through David Foster Wallace's novel Infinite Jest. Exploring both addiction and humility through the vector of habit, I argue that both habits indicate the non-self-sufficiency of a subject exposed to affection from outside. But while I position addiction alongside humility, both as habits, I also argue that humility parasitizes the totalizing logic of addictive habit. Neither identical to nor (...) simply the opposite of addiction, humility exploits addiction's structure of uncontrollable relationality. Even addiction depends on the affectability or rhetoricity of a subject always already exposed in language. Humility holds this rhetoricity open. (shrink)

Dieses Buch stellt das politische Denken von Erich Fromm systematisch dar und diskutiert es kritisch. Fromms Psychoanalyse des Politischen stellt einen bleibenden Beitrag zum modernen kritischen Verständnis von Freiheit und Demokratie dar. Ausgezeichnet mit dem "Internationalen Erich-Fromm-Preis" 2001.

Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisficing, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the (...) authors held a competition between the satisficing "Take The Best" algorithm and various "rational" inference procedures. The Take The Best algorithm matched or outperformed all competitors in inferential speed and accuracy. This result is an existence proof that cognitive mechanisms capable of successful performance in the real world do not need to satisfy the classical norms of rational inference. (shrink)

What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: (...) Behavior needs to be studied in social groups as well as in isolation, in natural environments as well as in labs. It also has implications for moral policy: Only by accepting the fact that behavior is a function of both mind and environmental structures can realistic prescriptive means of achieving moral goals be developed. (shrink)

Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: the discovery of less-is-more effects; the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; the (...) development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an “adaptive toolbox;” and the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people’s adaptive use of heuristics. Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies. (shrink)

Zwischen 1992 und 2008 erschienen in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung 133 Buchbesprechungen aus der Feder von Gerd Roellecke, der 2011 verstarb. Die in diesem Band nachgedruckte Auswahl bietet ein Panorama wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse, philosophischer Gedanken und politischer Standpunkte im Spiegel der pointierten Urteile Roelleckes. Den zeithistorischen Hintergrund bildet die Neuorientierung Deutschlands und Europas in den Jahren zwischen Wiedervereinigung und globaler Finanzkrise. Der Mannheimer Staatsrechtslehrer pruft Bucher aus allen Fachern, die sich im weitesten Sinne mit der Verfassung des sozialen Lebens beschaftigen, (...) von der Rechtsphilosophie bis zur Geschichtswissenschaft. Den roten Faden bildet in Anknupfung an Niklas Luhmann ein gesellschaftstheoretisches Interesse an den Uberlebensbedingungen der modernen Zivilisation. Kuriose Zeitzeugnisse sind fur den Kritiker nicht weniger aufschlussreich als epochemachende Standardwerke. Durch die Kunst der witzigen Zuspitzung ladt Roellecke zum Widerspruch ein - damit die Aufklarung weitergeht. (shrink)

In dieser Monographie wird, beginnend mit einem biographischen und zeitgeschichtlichen Grundriss, zum ersten Mal das umfangreiche strafrechtliche, rechtsphilosophische und philosophische Gesamtwerk Arthur Baumgartens dargestellt. Baumgarten war im Jahr seiner bei Franz v. Liszt verteidigten Dissertation nach Genf berufen worden und lehrte in Köln, Basel, Frankfurt/M. und Berlin. Von der dreiteiligen "Wissenschaft vom Recht" urteilte Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy im "Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts", hier sei die Jurisprudenz auf Philosophie gegründet, und die Lehre Baumgartens werde neben Stammler und Nelson die stärkste Wirkung (...) aufs Rechtsdenken gewinnen. Mit seinen philosophischen Schriften wurde Baumgarten, beeinflusst von James und Dewey, in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhunderts ein Vordenker des sozialliberalen Pragmatismus in der deutschen Philosophie und nahm deren Hinwendung zur angloamerikanischen philosophischen Tradition um Jahrzehnte vorweg. 1933 erklärte er, unterm NS-Regime nicht Rechtwissenschaft lehren zu können, und ging von Frankfurt in die Schweizer Emigration. Die Erfahrung von Faschismus und Krieg führte ihn in der Mitte der vierziger Jahre zu sozialistischen Überzeugungen und Erwartungen und zur Marxschen sozialwissenschaftlichen Methode, so dass er, nach Frankfurt nicht zurückberufen, gleich anderen antifaschistischen Intellektuellen in die Ostzone und spätere DDR zog. Gerd Irrlitz behandelt die Hauptwerke und die marxistisch orientierten Texte Baumgartens – wie überhaupt die sozialliberale und die späte sozialistische Periode – nicht als Gegensätze, sondern als aufeinander bezogene und einander bedingende Konzepte, überzeugt, dass das Werk des Rechtsphilosophen unterm Erfordernis der Erneuerung des sozialen Liberalismus in der hochindustriellen Zivilisation neue Aktualität gewinnen kann. (shrink)

In order to figure out why quantum physics needs the complex Hilbert space, many attempts have been made to distinguish the C*-algebras and von Neumann algebras in more general classes of abstractly defined Jordan algebras . One particularly important distinguishing property was identified by Alfsen and Shultz and is the existence of a dynamical correspondence. It reproduces the dual role of the selfadjoint operators as observables and generators of dynamical groups in quantum mechanics. In the paper, this concept is extended (...) to another class of nonassociative algebras, arising from recent studies of the quantum logics with a conditional probability calculus and particularly of those that rule out third-order interference. The conditional probability calculus is a mathematical model of the Lüders–von Neumann quantum measurement process, and third-order interference is a property of the conditional probabilities which was discovered by Sorkin and which is ruled out by quantum mechanics. It is shown then that the postulates that a dynamical correspondence exists and that the square of any algebra element is positive still characterize, in the class considered, those algebras that emerge from the selfadjoint parts of C*-algebras equipped with the Jordan product. Within this class, the two postulates thus result in ordinary quantum mechanics using the complex Hilbert space or, vice versa, a genuine generalization of quantum theory must omit at least one of them. (shrink)

The paper shows why and how an empirical study of fast-and-frugal heuristics can provide norms of good reasoning, and thus how (and how far) rationality can be naturalized. We explain the heuristics that humans often rely on in solving problems, for example, choosing investment strategies or apartments, placing bets in sports, or making library searches. We then show that heuristics can lead to judgments that are as accurate as or even more accurate than strategies that use more information and computation, (...) including optimization methods. A standard way to defend the use of heuristics is by reference to accuracy-effort trade-offs. We take a different route, emphasizing ecological rationality (the relationship between cognitive heuristics and environment), and argue that in uncertain environments, more information and computation are not always better (the “less-can-be-more” doctrine). The resulting naturalism about rationality is thus normative because it not only describes what heuristics people use, but also in which specific environments one should rely on a heuristic in order to make better inferences. While we desist from claiming that the scope of ecological rationality is unlimited, we think it is of wide practical use. (shrink)